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Ann M. Florini
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract
Transparency is on the rise, touted as the solution to such disparate problems as
financial volatility, environmental degradation, money laundering, and corruption.  But
transparency faces much opposition, particularly from those under scrutiny.  Such actors
often have strong incentives to avoid providing information.  To explain the growing
demand for transparency and to assess its prospects for success requires attention to
matters of politics – that is, power.  Power is often needed to induce disclosures or
restructure incentives.  And the information thus revealed can shift power from the former
holders of secrets to the newly informed.  This paper explores the politics of transparency
– why it is emerging, and what are the advantages and difficulties inherent in relying on
transparency to address global issues.
1Introduction
The “invisible hand” of the market, as we all now know, depends heavily on the
support of a thick “glove” of rules, norms, and institutions, including governments.  But
too often, the glove is opaque, obscuring flows of information essential to the efficient
and equitable functioning of both markets and the national and international institutions
that regulate them.  Of late, demands to make both institutions and markets transparent
have reached a fevered pitch. Many of the arguments on the creation of a new global
financial architecture put calls for increased transparency front and center.1
The rising clamor for transparency in economic, financial, and business
discussions reflects a global trend toward growing transparency across issue areas.
Scholars, policymakers, and activists have called for transparency in such varied contexts
as banking, auditing and accounting standards, national fiscal practices, control of drug
trafficking, environment, anti-corruption efforts, multilateral development assistance, and
private sector environmental and labor practices.2 In politics, promoters of democracy
have come to realize that elections alone cannot provide accountability unless citizens
can monitor the actions of the officials they elect.  In environmental issues, a whole field
of pollution regulation based on public disclosure by firms is arising, one that relies on
public pressure rather than government sanctions to induce firms to clean up (Tietenberg
and Wheeler 1998).  In arms control, the last years of the Cold War accustomed major
powers to the practice of inviting highly intrusive mutual scrutiny of one another's
                                               
1 G7 Leaders’ Statement 1998; Declaration of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 1998;
Ostry 1997; Working Group 1998; Sanger 1998, Sutherland 1998.  For useful cautions about the limits on
the role of transparency in prevention or resolving financial crises, see Eichengreen 1999.
2  On banking, see Basle Committee 1998 and Reinicke 1998.  On auditing and accounting standards, see
Byrnes 1998, Jones 1998, and Wippurfurth 1998.  On national fiscal practices, see Kopits and Craig 1998.
On control of drug trafficking, see Flynn 1999.  On environment, see Tietenberg and Wheeler 1998.  On
2military forces, a practice now broadening to include many more governments, and large
swaths of the private sector as well.  The chemical industry, for example, is now subject
to both regularly scheduled and surprise inspections at thousands of facilities around the
world, under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (Florini 1997).
The demands for transparency are increasing in large part because of
globalization.  As the world becomes more tightly integrated, many people are affected
by, and thus want to have a say in, what used to be other people's business.  As trade,
capital, environmental degradation, drugs, people, and ideas cross existing political
boundaries in ever greater quantities, events in one place have ever greater impacts on
other places.  Countries under pressure to attract foreign investment demand information
from their firms and government agencies.  International financial institutions, which are
major promoters of economic integration, are beginning to make strong recommendations
for what information governments should demand from citizens and firms.
There are good reasons to believe that increased transparency would frequently be
beneficial, often indispensable, and sometimes a moral imperative.  Consistent
transparency can smooth the operation of financial markets, and may attract the
investment that fosters growth.  It provides a means of detecting, and thus correcting,
errors in the policies of governmental and international institutions – errors that in the era
of economic integration can wreak havoc on bystanders if left uncorrected.  Most
important, as democratic norms spread, it is harder and harder to maintain societal
consensus around decisions reached in secret by small elites.  Publics have proved willing
                                                                                                                                           
corruption, see Dye and Stapenhurst 1998, Naim 1995 and Vogl 1998.  On multilateral development banks,
see Udall 1998.  On private sector practices, see Haufler forthcoming.
3to accept painful reforms, but only when they have been fully consulted and kept fully
informed.
Despite the benefits, increasing transparency is hard to do. It often requires power
to induce disclosure, either by coercion or by restructuring incentives, and the
information thus revealed can shift power from the former holders of secrets to the newly
informed.  Even when a given government or corporation would find it in its institutional
interest to be transparent, individuals within such institutions may prefer secrecy, to cover
up incompetence, to protect opportunities for rent-seeking, or simply to avoid the bother
of public scrutiny (Stiglitz 1998). And when a government or corporation is generating
externalities by, for example, lying about its financial reserves (thus risking a financial
crisis that would prove costly to others) or secretly dumping toxic substances, it has
obvious incentives to try to hide the problem.
The key to bringing about transparency is to pay attention to incentives, because
most of the time obtaining information about a government or corporation is infeasible
without the help of that government or corporation. With rare exceptions transparency
depends on the more-or-less “voluntary” provision of information by the target of the
calls for transparency. The European Union is not made more transparent by citizens
breaking into bureaucrats’ offices -- rather, it becomes more transparent when the
bureaucrats make files accessible.  National and corporate accounts become transparent
only when governments and corporations publish them. Because increasing transparency
generally requires institutions and individuals to release information they are accustomed
to withholding, transparency will rarely come about unless pressures can be brought to
bear. Because international organizations like the World Bank and the IMF pursue many
4of the goals that transparency can help to meet, and because these institutions can serve
as important sources of pressure to encourage transparency, it would behoove them to
pay careful and systematic attention both to analyzing what good transparency can do and
to considering how they can help to bring it about.
The Meaning and Value of Transparency
Although the term "transparency" seems ubiquitous these days, it is rarely defined
with much rigor.  Of whom is information being demanded?  What specific information
would be most useful for what purposes, and how much information is needed?  Part of
the looseness of the term stems from the fact that it is being used in so many different
issue areas.  In politics, it equates to enabling citizens to learn what governments are up
to through information provided by the government.  The term has been especially
widespread in the discussions of the European community -- indeed, Brewer's Politics
defines it as "the catch word for the openness of the operations of the European
Community to the public gaze" (Safire 1998).  In economics and finance, the Working
Group on Transparency and Accountability of the Group of 22 defined it very broadly as
“a process by which information about existing conditions, decisions and actions is made
accessible, visible and understandable” (Working Group 1998).  The national
security/arms control field uses a relatively narrow definition of  transparency as
involving the systematic provision of information on specific aspects of military activities
under informal or formal international arrangements (United Nations Experts Group
1991).
5These varied definitions, drawn from disparate issue areas, make clear that
transparency is always closely connected to accountability.  The purpose of calls for
transparency is to permit citizens, markets, or governments to hold others accountable for
their policies and performance.  Thus, transparency can be defined as the release of
information by institutions that is relevant to evaluating those institutions.
Because transparency is a tool to permit evaluation, much of its value lies in its
role in overcoming the principal-agent problem – that is, the difficulties principals have
in ensuring that their agents do what the principals want them to do, rather than what is in
the interest of the agent.  In the corporate world, firm managers are supposed to be agents
of the owners, who hold stock, but without transparency owners cannot know whether the
company is being well-managed, and investors have poor grounds for determining
whether they should become owners. (And lack of transparency can contribute to herd
behavior on the part of fund managers, if they have few signals other than the actions of
other investors on which to base their judgments.)  In the realm of politics, governments
are the agents of their citizens, but the wave of corruption scandals seen in the 1990s
indicates that too many government officials are serving private rather than public ends
whenever no one is looking.
If opacity has such negative effects, increased levels of transparency would seem
to serve the public interest, necessary to both good governance and well-functioning
markets. It is a general principle of good governance that decision makers should be held
accountable for their decisions.  Otherwise, error feeds upon error, and corruption breeds
unchecked.
6The demands for transparency also have a moral dimension. In principal-agent
situations, people have the right to know a great deal about their agents, even – or
especially – when the agents are governments or international organizations and the
principals are the general public.  Citizens have a right to know about the economic
performance of their government.   Consumers and investors have a right to honest
information about the products they buy and the companies they invest in.   Because
economies cross national borders, so do those rights.
However, it is important to be pragmatic about where it is worthwhile to push for
transparency, because that push is costly and not always worth the cost. Transparency
merely lets people see streams of facts.  It neither enables people to do anything about
those facts, nor conveys any understanding of their meaning. Transparency can only work
well if two conditions are met: 1) the targets of the calls for transparency are able and
willing to provide the requisite information; and 2) the recipients of the information are
able to use it to evaluate the provider of the information according to some accepted
standard of behavior.
It can be surprisingly difficult to compile economic and financial information,
especially in developing countries that almost by definition are short on the human
capital and institutions needed.  Programs to help public sector entities learn how to
compile and transmit information could usefully be expanded.
Once actors are able to be transparent, what makes them willing?  What inherent
incentives for transparency exist, and what carrots or sticks have to be applied to induce
that “willingness”?  The answer depends on whether the information will be used to deter
misbehavior or signal good behavior.  Shining a spotlight on miscreants can induce them
7not to misbehave if they are convinced that they are likely to be caught and penalized if
they do – in other words, by deterring them. The flip side of deterrence is reassurance.
While deterrence is about preventing someone from failing to abide by a standard,
reassurance enables an actor to prove that he or she is abiding by the standard.  Such
reassurance can be crucial, for stockholders deciding whether to hold or sell their shares,
or for countries trying to prove that they are not about to attack their neighbors.
Obviously, the incentives for providing information differ dramatically depending
on whether transparency is being used for deterrence or reassurance – that is, on whether
the target wants to be held accountable.  If  transparency is being used to try to deter a
particular behavior, one must assume that in the absence of transparency, some actors
find it in their interest to misbehave.  Thus, one must also assume that they will find it in
their interest to stonewall or lie about their behavior.  Such cases require careful attention
to overcoming their incentive to deceive and to finding ways to verify the information
that is released.  In cases of reassurance, the incentive problem does not exist. All that is
required is the provision of the institutions that make the information conveyed credible.
But for reassurance to work and for deterrence to be legitimate, providers and
recipients of information have to agree on what the information means.  Transparency
matters because it is coupled with some form of accountability.  But such accountability
requires the prior existence of a shared standard of behavior.  Businesses and
governments object to NGO demands for transparency in large part because NGOs
sometimes use the information to chastise them for failing to meet standards those firms
and governments never agreed they should meet.
8Such standards, in turn, depend on shared understandings of the meaning of the
information conveyed by transparency.  Transparency, after all, conveys facts, not
knowledge about causal connections. 3  Recipients of information react to that
information based on theories about its meaning.  Transparency can only create
reassurance if the providers and recipients of the information agree that the information
provided in fact describes a desirable situation.  The same announcement of workforce
layoffs that can propel stock prices to new highs in the US, where such layoffs are seen as
signs of greater efficiency, can force the resignation of corporate leaders in Japan, where
layoffs are seen as threats to the social order.
Even if all these conditions are met, increasing levels of transparency can
sometimes have negative effects.  For those on whom the spotlight shines, transparency
can threaten more than mere discomfort.  It is not wise to assume that international
organizations, governments, firms, financial markets, NGOs, and others necessarily want
to use information solely for the public good or for mutually beneficial economic
exchange.  In arms control, the same information that reassures others that your military
forces are not massing for attack can enable those others to locate and attack your forces.
In economics, misinterpretation or deliberate misuse of information by national or
corporate rivals can spark unfavorable headlines, plunges in stock prices, and capital
flight.   And transparency does not always redistribute power from the strong to the weak.
Secrecy can be the refuge of the weak against the strong, as in the case of human rights
organizations working in repressive countries.
                                               
3 The term "transparency" is sometimes itself used to refer to such knowledge-creation.  In her discussion
of the need for transparency as part of a potential new regime for foreign direct investment, for example,
Sylvia Ostry (1997) contends that greater knowledge about the number and range of foreign investment
9It is also possible to have too much transparency. Too much disclosure can
produce a white noise effect, making it difficult to know what is significant or even to
have the time to sort through all the data.  Indeed, in a cynical view, if you really want to
hide information, the best thing to do is to bury it in a flood of data.  Moreover,
disclosing information requires time and effort, and it can be hard to keep up with all the
demands.  For example, firms are increasingly being bombarded with calls for
transparency on their environmental and labor practices, often paired with demands to
permit third party certification of their compliance with "voluntary" corporate social
responsibility standards (Haufler forthcoming).
If transparency is to be used successfully, it will also have to be used judiciously,
with careful attention to minimizing the burden created by the demand for information
and to formatting information in user-friendly ways that minimize the white noise effect.
Specific Applications of Transparency
The many calls for increased transparency are being applied to different issue
areas and different types of actors for different purposes.  Transparency is expected to
improve the efficiency and fairness of markets and corporations, and to foster the
accountability and legitimacy of national governments and intergovermental
organizations.  This is a heavy burden for a relatively new buzzword, raising two
fundamental questions that cross issue areas and actors.  First, would increased
transparency do much good?  Second, can transparency be made to happen, given
problems with both incentives and capabilities to provide information?  While several
                                                                                                                                           
initiatives, currently unavailable, would itself constitute an increase in transparency - a quite different use
of the term from the one employed in this paper.
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books could  be written on these questions, each on a different issue area, this paper will
confine itself to two subjects: transparency in the global economy, and transparency in
the international financial institutions themselves.
Transparency in the Global Economy
Can transparency ameliorate such downsides of the globalization of financial
markets as volatility, increased money laundering, and the avoidance of necessary fiscal
reforms (Tanzi 1996)?  Apparently, quite a few people think so.  As was noted on page
one, calls for transparency are nowhere louder than in the debate over the new financial
architecture.  Although this is hardly the first financial crisis the world has faced,
transparency is being touted as never before.  In part, this reflects the efforts of investors
to shift the blame for their poor investment decisions (Furman and Stiglitz 1998, p. 56).
But it also reflects an increase in the desire of investors to find investment opportunities
across national borders, and pressures by countries well endowed with capital,
particularly the U.S., to smooth their path. Demands for transparency are arising for
much the same reason seen in U.S. domestic equity markets over the past century, as a
result of the growth in the number of investors wanting means to assess the quality and
risks of portfolio investments across a broad range of countries.4
                                               
4 In part because of its extensive experience with corporate financial disclosure, the United States is
particularly prone to see transparency as a major and essential element of global financial regulation.  Early
in this century, large numbers of small investors proved able to put substantial political pressure on the
government to protect them from deceit and insider dealings.  Disclosures became mandatory after the
Depression-era creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to oversee mandatory corporate
disclosure practices.  From then on, companies whose securities were listed on national securities
exchanges were required to file periodic reports whose form and content was determined by the SEC
(Cochrane 1984 p. 186).  Demand for the disclosure of fuller, more reliable, and more comprehensible
financial data has continued, driven by the growth of both small shareholders and institutional investors.
America is not alone in having relatively high standards for corporate financial disclosure.  Great Britain
experimented with disclosure laws starting in the mid-eighteenth century (Lee and Parker 1984). America
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Financial markets, more than others, depend on information to function well.  For
investors to know who will most productively use their capital, given the inherent
incentives for charlatans to lie to get their hands on the money, they must have some
basis for discriminating among the vying claimants.  Mechanisms for such discrimination
include personal trust, reputation, or the existence of well-functioning legal systems to
prosecute fraud (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1991), and/or insurance systems to enable
investors to recover some of their money when they guess wrong (Haufler 1997).  Such
systems do not seem to be working well in the rapidly-evolving global financial system,
especially for flows like portfolio investments.  Reputations, where they exist, can be
unreliable, legal systems find it hard to stretch enforcement powers across national
borders, and insurance systems raise as-yet-unresolved issues of moral hazard.
Would substantial increases in transparency prevent or ameliorate the kinds of
crises that have afflicted so much of the world in the past few years?  This appears to be
the prevailing assumption, leading to demands for increased amounts of information from
both firms and governments (for example, Working Group 1998). As Barry Eichengreen
has noted, greater transparency could reduce the incidence of financial crises:  “Better
information on the economic and financial affairs of governments, banks, and
corporations will strengthen market discipline (encourage lenders to ration credit to
borrowers who fail to take the steps needed to maintain their financial stability) and help
policymakers to identify the need for corrective action”  (Eichengreen 1999, p. 10). It is
certainly plausible that better information would enable investors, governments, and
                                                                                                                                           
and Britain are unusual in the degree to which their firms rely on equity financing rather than bank loans.
But given the degree to which equity financing is spreading, these experiences may hold some useful
lessons.
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international financial institutions to improve the reliability of risk assessment, leading to
better investment decisions and better government policy.
Transparency by itself will not suffice, however, in part because it is never
absolute, and in part because lack of information is not the only cause of financial
meltdown.  Scandinavia, with some of the world's most transparent systems, was not
thereby protected from financial trauma a decade ago (Furman and Stiglitz 1998).  Under
some circumstances, transparency could even be harmful, for example leading to the
closure of shaky financial institutions that otherwise might over time recover (Furman
and Stiglitz 1998, p. 68).5  But overall, regular and consistent transparency would
promote economic efficiency and reduce the “lumpiness” of negative information that
can pose such large adjustment costs.
The calls for transparency aim at two distinct targets: firms and governments.
With regard to firms, levels of corporate disclosure vary greatly across countries.  In
recent decades, some transnational associations have attempted to develop standards of
disclosure that could be followed globally.  The International Accounting Standards
Committee several years ago put forward rather flexible standards that have been adopted
in a number of developing countries, for whom it is easier to adopt such standards than to
develop their own (Jones 1998). In the 1990s, responding to pressures from institutional
                                               
5 At present, there are no good measures of transparency, making it very hard to quantify
correlations between economic stability and various degrees of transparency, much less argue about
causation. Although it is difficult now to disentangle the effects of varying degrees of transparency from
other causes of economic inefficiencies, in a few years more data may be available.  As will be detailed
below, an enormous range of proposals for international standards of transparency are being proposed for
all sorts of data relevant to global finance.  If a number of these are adopted, and in particular if the G-22's
Working Group's recommendations concerning "transparency about transparency" are followed, good data
should become available about which firms and countries are relatively transparent and which are not,
according to a variety of new disclosure standards.  Such data should make it possible to determine what
types of transparency have what types of effects.
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investors for better data, the IASC has been developing a set of more rigorous standards,
which it hopes will be endorsed by the International Organization for Securities
Commissions (IOSCO).
But incentives to adopt and enforce the new corporate disclosure standards may
be lacking.  The United States, which already has rigorous standards, is reluctant to
accept universal standards that are weaker than its own.  Arthur Levitt, chairman of the
SEC, commented in October 1998 that "we're not going to embrace any standard that isn't
as good as our own.  We're the best capital market in the world."  Many European
countries, on the other hand, have been ambivalent about the new IASC standards
because they feel that their development has been dominated by the United States and
Great Britain (Jones 1998).
Even if improved transparency standards for firms are adopted, it is by no means
certain that the standards will actually lead to greater transparency.  As the G-22 Working
Group acknowledged, the big problem lies with behavior, not laws: “poor disclosure
practices stem from inadequate compliance with and enforcement of existing standards”
(Working Group 1998, p. vi). Poor countries may find the proposed standards too
rigorous and complex.  If firms already fail to comply, why should creating more
disclosure standards matter?
The hope appears to be that once a standardized format is available so that
investors can compare firms across countries, market forces will impel compliance by
channeling investment to the more transparent companies.  Indeed, some research
indicates that firms are finding that transparency attracts investment (Mavrinac and
Fiorillo 1997).  The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, in its discussion of
14
enhancing bank transparency, similarly argues that the market provides incentives for
banks to be perceived as conducting their business in an efficient and prudent manner.  In
the terms of this paper, it is in the interest of well-run banks to provide reassurance
through greater transparency.  For other banks, however, transparency's most important
effect would be deterrence: “To the extent a bank's management knows its activities and
risk exposures will be transparent… investment decisions and other business decisions [by
market participants] can provide a strong incentive for bank management to improve risk
management practices and internal controls” (Basle Committee 1998, p. 6).  But such
deterrence depends heavily on a credible threat that banks will be unable to avoid such
public disclosure – a threat that many governments may be unable to enforce.
It is also widely argued that countries need to become transparent to attract
investment, and that such transparency requires governments to provide timely and
complete information about macroeconomic developments and policies.  The variety of
emerging standards for transparency on a range of governmental economic and financial
data is truly impressive (IMF, nd).  In March 1996, the IMF unveiled its Special Data
Dissemination Standard, for countries having or seeking access to international capital
markets (IMF 1996).  The Special Standard specifies what economic performance and
policy data should be made available to the public, how often, how widely, and by what
processes.  (For other countries, the IMF has created the General Data Dissemination
Standard.)  Since September 1996, the IMF has maintained an electronic Dissemination
Standard Bulletin Board, providing for anyone who cares to log on information on the
more than 40 countries that have subscribed to the Special Data Dissemination Standard,
in many cases with hyperlinks to data available on national Internet data sites
15
(http://dsbb.imf.org).  In April 1998, the Interim Committee adopted a Code of Good
Practices on Fiscal Transparency, and the IMF is developing a Manual on Fiscal
Transparency (IMF “Manual” 1998).  Other efforts at creating global disclosure standards
for governments include the accounting standards for the public sector put forward by the
International Federation of Accountants and the international standards for government
auditing set by the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions.
But such disclosures, intended to enable countries to attract foreign investment,
would have domestic political effects as well.  Indeed, as the G-22 Working Group
argues, because one of the primary responsibilities of national governments is to maintain
macroeconomic stability, the accountability of national authorities requires the provision
of such information (Working Group 1998 p. vii).  In other words, citizens need to know
how the economy is doing and what the government is doing about it so that they can, if
necessary, demand changes in those policies -  or in the officials.
Governmental incentives not to be transparent could hardly be more evident. And
when it comes to macroeconomic policies, governments have all sorts of ways to muddle
the picture.  As one recent IMF paper argued, the complexity of the budgets of modern
economies is partly artificial, created to help politicians hide taxes, overemphasize the
benefits of spending, and hide government liabilities (Alesina and Perotti 1996).  It
outlines several ways governments can and do obfuscate the budget:
-  through overly optimistic projections of growth and tax revenues, which then
   result in “unexpected” deficits;
– through keeping some items off budget;
– through inflating the baseline in budgetary projections, making future budgetary
16
   increases appear smaller than they actually are; and
– through multi-year budgeting that postpones all hard decisions to out-years,
   which somehow keep getting postponed.
With all these and other tools of opacity at their disposal, all the current and proposed
standards for governmental disclosure clearly face enormous obstacles.
Both carrots and sticks could help to overcome the existing incentives for
continued opacity by both government and firms.  To strengthen the carrot of increased
investment flows, the international financial institutions could help to make compliance
with transparency requirements an easy signal for investors to read.  Here, such proposals
as that of the Working Group  to have the IMF issue country-specific Transparency
Reports that summarize the degree to which a national economy meets internationally
recognized disclosure standards could offer a very useful example.6  If enough countries
and firms do abide by such standards and their compliance is widely reported, mere
compliance with the transparency requirement may serve as a significant seal of approval
– even if the underlying data aren't all that impressive.  On the "sticks" side, the
international financial institutions could make compliance with disclosure standards a
condition of loans.
Up to this point, this discussion of the value of and incentives for transparency in
the global financial system has left out one very important actor.   All these calls for
transparency are aimed at making life easier for investors.  Yet some of the investors that
                                               
6 Such a certification of compliance with transparency standards sidesteps the problems the IMF has with
releasing too much information about the economies of its member countries.  These problems are caused
by the dual nature of the IMF’s mandate: It both provides advice to individual governments and serves as a
certifier of good economic practices by those same governments.  If the Fund releases information about
specific countries, those governments have every incentive to conceal bad news from the IMF, making it
difficult for the Fund to provide well-informed advice.
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have wreaked the greatest havoc, such as hedge funds, themselves are among the least
transparent of actors.  Even though their decisions can make or break national economies,
they are largely unaccountable.  Standard assumptions about the working of financial
markets hold this opacity to be a virtue rather than a drawback. Financial firms have
strong incentives to object to any disclosures that could lead to a competitive
disadvantage.  Hedge funds, for example, do not want to disclose to others what their
positions are in various markets because those positions may be taken as signals by other
investors.  Anonymity for investors is important for the liquidity of financial markets
(Eichengreen et al, 1998).  Yet is it reasonable to expect high standards of transparency
from everyone in the international financial system except the investors?
The Dark Side of the Global Economy:  Up to this point, we have been assuming
good intentions on the part of economic actors, though not good performance.  But illegal
activities, such as money laundering or governmental corruption, can also threaten the
stability and efficiency of the global financial architecture. Illicit activities are inherently
very difficult to measure, but both money laundering and corruption appear to be large
problems.  All estimates of money laundering start in the hundreds of billions of dollars –
on a par with mid-size national economics and many of the largest global industries
(Flynn 1999).  As for corruption, a rapidly growing literature demonstrates the high
economic and political costs of this pervasive problem (Mauro 1997; Rose-Ackerman
1997).
When self-interested behavior veers into outright criminality, does transparency
still have a role to play?  Because these activities are generally illegal, if transparency can
be made to work, there seems little doubt that it would change behavior.  If evidence of
18
such activities can be gathered, the guilty can be held accountable through criminal
prosecution.  And in the case of corruption, even when criminal prosecutions do not
occur, revelations of corruption can force the tainted from office.  But it is equally clear
that criminals and corrupt officials have overwhelming incentives to resist disclosure of
information about their activities.  As a result, those calling for transparency must target a
very broad range of actors and activities, hoping to eliminate the shadows in which the
unsavory lurk, but necessarily spotlighting the innocent as well.
Many of the proposed solutions to money laundering take just such an approach.
In 1989 at their Paris Summit meeting, the G-7 established the Financial Action Task
Force, headquartered at the OECD, to examine measures to combat money laundering.7
Of the forty Recommendations the FATF issued in 1990 (revised in 1996), some half-
dozen relate directly to a form of transparency.  These add up to a "know-your-customer"
requirement for banks and other financial institutions.  According to these
recommendations, financial institutions should identify their customers accurately,
determine what activities are normal for those customers, pay special attention to large
and/or unusual transactions or patterns of transactions, and report to the competent
authorities any suspicions that funds stem from criminal activities (Recommendations 10-
12, 14-15).  Similarly, the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision issued by
the Basle Committee in September 1997, argue that banks should "have adequate
policies, practices and procedures in place, including strict "know-your-customer" rules,
                                               
7 The FATF has 26 member governments (mostly OECD countries, plus China), and two member regional
organizations (The European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council).  Delegations to the FATF
draw from many fields and government agencies, including ministries of finance, justice, interior and
external affairs, financial regulatory authorities, and law enforcement agencies (Financial Action Task
Force 1998, p. 6).  Originally scheduled to last until 1999, the FATF has now been extended until 2004.
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that promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial sector and prevent
the bank being used, intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal elements".  Most FATF
members have implemented requirements for mandatory reporting of suspicious
transactions (Financial Action Task Force 1998, p. 73).
It is not clear, however, that transparency will significantly constrain money
laundering unless it is pressed much farther.  In most cases the reporting obligation
extends only to financial institutions, and even when it applies more broadly, almost all
reports are made by financial institutions, particularly banks (Financial Action Task
Force 1998, p. 74).  Not surprisingly, money launderers have shifted to using non-bank
financial institutions and non-financial businesses (Financial Action Task Force 1998, p.
74).  Such transparency measures as reporting requirements may be hard pressed to keep
up with the shifting patterns of money laundering activities.
The limitations of reporting requirements have spurred calls for even greater uses
of transparency.  One analysis calls for 1) restructuring the interbank payment system so
that wire transfers document the originator and beneficiary of the transaction, and 2)
regular publication of an "Accessories to Transovereign Crime Report" spotlighting
"governments, business institutions, or individuals who routinely fail to abide by regional
and international crime control conventions" (Flynn 1999, p. 119-120).
But just as  the backlash against globalization is triggering calls for transparency,
transparency has the potential to spur its own backlash, even from those engaged in
purely legitimate activity.  When in December 1998 the U.S. government published a
proposed regulation establishing uniform and mandatory know-your-customer banking
procedures as part of the U.S. anti-money laundering effort, it unleashed a firestorm of
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wholly unexpected public protest.  The American Banker's Association protested that the
rules did not apply to other financial institutions such as broker dealers, insurance
agencies, and securities dealers (Maier 1999).  But the overwhelming response objected
to the invasion of  individual privacy in the absence of prior probable cause to believe
that everyone being monitored was engaged in illicit activity.  One member of the U.S.
Congress has dubbed the proposal the "Spy on Your Neighbor" rule and has sponsored a
bill to kill the proposal should it be adopted (Maier 1999).
It would appear that in the case of money laundering, the incentives to provide
information have to include incentives for the law-abiding to allow themselves to be
monitored.  Such monitoring runs counter to deeply-embedded suspicions of authority in
some countries.  In others, where objections have not yet been heard, problems may yet
arise if the information is misused.  If transparency is to play a significant role in
controlling illegal flows of capital, a major public education program is required to
convince the public of the need, and careful attention will have to be paid to safeguards to
protect against the misuse and abuse of personal financial information.
Corruption:  Corruption – the abuse of public office for private gain – would
seem to be a problem tailor-made for the transparency solution.  It is not only illegal in
most places to take bribes, it is also, for most public officials, highly embarrassing to be
caught.  In the 1990s, publics in all parts of the world, from Italy to Brazil to Pakistan to
Zaire, have made it clear that revelations of corruption carry heavy penalties (Economist
1999).  In the first half of the 1990s, government ministers in India, Japan, Argentina,
Britain, and Switzerland were forced to resign due to corruption charges (Naim 1995, p.
246).  Shining the spotlight on corruption may not always topple governments or put
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politicians behind bars, but it has done so often enough that the prospect of transparency
is likely to have a significant deterrent effect. It does not always work – the campaign
finance system in the US, for example, seems impervious to any degree of revelation –
but by and large transparency makes a difference against corruption.
The incentives against transparency in this field are obvious.  Few corrupt
officials confess.  They get caught.  However, although those officials have every
incentive to keep their dealings opaque, others in those societies have incentives to
increase the transparency of governmental processes. Honest officials welcome and
promote transparency – some prominent figures in Transparency International, the
international NGO that has led the global campaign against corruption, have been active
in politics, although Transparency International itself maintains a nonpartisan stance
Demands for greater transparency to deal with corruption generally arise in two
forms: from a newly empowered media in much of the world that has discovered the
profit potential of corruption scandals (Naim 1995, page 257); and from an international
community of donors and NGOs fed up with the diversion of development funds into
private coffers.  The latter have come up with some innovative techniques for
spotlighting corruption that get around the obvious disincentives to transparency.
Transparency International’s annual corruption perceptions index, which ranks countries
on how corrupt they are perceived to be according to surveys of businesspeople, political
analysts, and the public, put both corruption and TI on the map.  This highly visible
information often becomes headline news and the subject of parliamentary debates.
Transparency International is now planning a second index to spotlight the supply side of
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international corruption, with a poll on which countries are home to the corporations most
likely to offer bribes.8
In short, increasing transparency will be key to the future success of economic
integration.  Only with transparency will it be possible to deter corruption, crack down on
money laundering, and foster efficiency in the allocation of investments across
companies and countries.  Moreover, economic integration will have little legitimacy
among the public as long as it remains a mysterious, unaccountable process.
But increasing transparency will be no easy task.  Transparency comes up against
obstacles ranging from the legitimate privacy concerns of individuals to the desire of rent
seekers to hide their ill gotten gains.  Transparency also runs counter to entrenched
beliefs in many parts of the world that governments need not be accountable on an on-
going basis to their citizenry.  Similar beliefs prevail among much of the world's
economic policy elite, who argue that they should not be publicly accountable.
Overcoming these obstacles to transparency should form a major part of the future
agenda of the World Bank and the IMF.  But are they themselves sufficiently transparent
to credibly lead the campaign for transparency?
International Financial Institutions as Targets of Transparency
For their first several decades, both the World Bank and the IMF were highly
secretive institutions, answering (though sometimes with less than complete candidness)
                                               
8Along with the pressures generated by the media and civil society spotlights, the World Bank has
put heavy emphasis on anti-corruption efforts.  It created an Anti-Corruption Knowledge Center in April
1998 that works to mainstream anti-corruption activities into country assistance strategies, economic sector
work, and Bank operations. The Bank's Economic Development Institute has a Governance and Anti-
corruption Program that works with both client countries and other donors.  With serious attention to
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only to their member governments and providing little information to the public.  Since
the early 1980s, no international organization has faced more vociferous demands to open
up than the World Bank.  Starting in the early 1980s, a wide range of non-governmental
organizations began pressuring the Bank to become far more forthcoming about its plans
and policies, arguing that “if development bank project planning and design were open
and transparent… fewer disastrous projects would be approved and a greater opportunity
to promote development alternatives would exist” (Udall 1998, p. 391). Three different
transnational civil society networks - on poverty, environment, and structural adjustment
- have coalesced around opposition to World Bank projects and procedures (Nelson
1996). Of late, the IMF has begun to experience similar demands.
The proponents of World Bank transparency are right.  In the days when the Bank
remained cloaked in secrecy, too often government officials in both borrowing and donor
countries were less concerned with the quality of the projects being funded than with
other considerations, such as the political imperatives of channeling funds to particular
governments or the opportunities for personal enrichment or political power.  Although at
least some of the actors now demanding transparency from the Bank undoubtedly have
their own agendas, to the degree that the Bank truly becomes transparent, all agendas will
have to be contested openly.
These pressures for transparency have had an impact in part because the argument
resonated so effectively with U.S. policymakers.  Most important, members of Congress
proved willing to hold funding for the Bank hostage to the establishment of new Bank
disclosure policies (Udall 1998, p. 402-403).  Under the disclosure policy established a
                                                                                                                                           
corruption conditioning the decisions of such major sources of funds as the World Bank, countries face
significantly enhanced incentives to root out corruption.
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decade ago and revised in 1993, the Bank releases a Project Information Document on
every project.  Also available are final staff appraisal reports, environmental impact
statements, and other documents.
But whether meaningful transparency can be made to happen, or is already being
made to happen, is less clear.  As is virtually always the case, policies from above to
promote transparency within an institution provide only a starting point.  Whether Project
Information Documents actually contain information that make it possible for outsiders to
comment meaningfully on projects in the early stages of planning will depend on the
incentives World Bank staff face.  If staffers are rewarded primarily for moving money –
getting large projects through the pipeline quickly – they will have every incentive to
make those documents as bland and meaningless as possible, so as to avoid giving
grounds for objections to the projects.  If, however, Bank staff are held accountable for
the ultimate success of projects, they will have every incentive to permit widespread
participation in the planning and preparation of projects so as to be able to anticipate
problems and ensure that stakeholders in the borrowing countries support rather than
oppose those projects.  In short, the disclosure policy by itself means little.  It can be just
another bureaucratic hurdle, or it can be a useful and welcome tool.
Beyond this question of the utility of transparency as a means of helping the Bank
to do its job better lies a moral issue.  The Bank is not an end in itself.  It exists to provide
certain services.  It was constituted by national governments, but its avowed goal is to
help the world’s poor.  In other words, the Bank is an agent, but it arguably answers to
two quite different principals: those affected by the projects it helps to finance, and the
governments of its member states.  Governments are in turn supposed to be agents for
                                                                                                                                           
 See the Center's website at www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/anticorruption/
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their citizens.  When, as has been known to happen, governments use Bank funds in ways
that are not in the interests of their citizens, and when those citizens are complaining
loudly and clearly to the Bank about those uses, should the Bank withhold information
from affected citizens on the grounds that only their governments – the supposed agents
of those citizens – are entitled to see that information?
The IMF is now beginning to face similar demands that it provide information
about its plans, policies, decision-making procedures, and the effectiveness of its
programs.  As one non-governmental organization has argued, it is not enough for the
IMF to provide information only to its member governments because institutions like the
IMF “can directly affect the welfare of large groups of the world’s population” (Center of
Concern 1998, p. 5), some of whom are not well represented or well served by the
governments with whom the IMF negotiates.   Without such public assessment, the IMF
may be hard pressed to bolster its legitimacy around the world, and without that
legitimacy, it will be difficult for the IMF to sustain its work.  As the IMF has found
through bitter experience, programs secretly arrived at in consultation with government
officials only, and imposed without adequate involvement by and explanation to the
public, are likely to prove less than effective.
The IMF has already begun to increase efforts to inform publics directly about the
nature of and rationale for IMF programs, rather than relying on governments to inform
citizens.  Yet for the most part, the IMF leaves it up to governments to decide whether
information is to be publicly released.  The IMF could easily push much harder, making
publication of many of its documents a condition of lending. And certainly, the IMF
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should not hide behind the façade of market sensitivity as a rationale for keeping its own
Executive Board minutes secret for thirty years.
The Future of Transparency
How important a role transparency plays in future efforts to manage global
problems – indeed, whether some global problems can be managed – will depend on two
things: whether the demand for transparency continues to grow, and whether a culture of
transparency can be cultivated, to help counterbalance incentives for continued opacity.
For several reasons, the calls for transparency seen to date are probably only the
beginning of a tidal wave of such demands.  Part of the reason, as discussed above, is
globalization – as people become more interdependent, they need to know more about
each other.  But transparency is growing for other reasons as well: 1) technology; 2)
democratization and the development of civil society at both the national and global
levels; and  3) the role of the United States as the world’s leading power.
Technology:  Thanks to the information revolution, some of the costs of being
transparent have plummeted.  This revolution encompasses technologies that produce,
process, and convey information, including microelectronics, computers,
telecommunications, and optical electronics.  While information technology services of
various kinds have been around for decades, if not centuries, what is new is the scope of
the technologies and the convergence among them.  Not only are surveillance systems,
broadcasting systems, data processors, and telecommunications technologies all
becoming vastly and rapidly cheaper and more capable, but they are increasingly able to
interact.
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This is the essence of the digital revolution.  Information is being reduced to the
same basic form in all these systems: bits that can travel from one technology to another.
And because the technologies interact, progress in one stimulates developments in the
others.  Data collection systems, including everything from supermarket checkout
scanners to satellite-based remote sensors, gather vast quantities of raw data.  Computers
turn those enormous data streams into usable information.  Telecommunications systems
are becoming cheap and ubiquitous enough that a significant share of the world's
population now has access to that usable information, and can send it to others.
Put it all together and the result is a lot of information flowing around the world.
Some of it is wholly new: three decades ago no one could monitor consumers' buying
habits or gather global data on land-use patterns.  Some used to be available only to small
groups, such as the highly classified data flowing from superpower spy satellites.
Although the information revolution needs to be put in historical context – it began, in a
sense, 500 years ago with the printing press, and every development since then from the
telegraph to the telephone has been greeted with predictions of imminent global
transformation – the current technological convergence really does seem to represent
something quantitatively and qualitatively new.
It would be hard to exaggerate the pace of this revolution:
, This year, three private companies plan to launch commercial remote-
sensing satellites capable of detecting objects as small as one meter – nearly as
good as spy satellites.  Once all the planned commercial and governmental
systems reach orbit over the next few years, anyone with a few hundred dollars
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will be able to purchase detailed satellite imagery of any spot on the planet
(Center for Global Security and Cooperation 1999).
, On the ground, both governments and citizens are making extensive use of
surveillance cameras (Brin 1998).  Soon, cameras too small to be seen from any
distance will be widely available (Florini 1998).
, Computing power has abided by Moore's Law, doubling about every 18
months, for more than 25 years, and shows no signs of slowing its relentless
advance.
, Telecommunications is connecting more and more people and allowing
them to share larger quantities of information.  Several companies are launching
constellations of satellites that will permit wireless "roaming" anywhere on the
planet (Evans 1998).  One system, Iridium, is already operational.  Iridium
transmits only voice, but others will transmit data and even video.
While no one of these technologies is guaranteed market success, the pattern is
clear: the quantity and scope of data being transmitted, the capacity to manipulate the
data, and the number of people connected are all skyrocketing.  All this technology does
more than reduce the direct costs of transparency, creating a shift along the demand
curve.  It also facilitates global integration and, by decentralizing information, empowers
civil society, thus contributing to the outward shift of the demand curve.
Democracy and Civil Society:9  The spread of democratic ideals and democratic
forms of government has contributed greatly to demands for transparency.  Newly
empowered citizens want to know what their newly-elected officials are doing.  Newly
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elected officials have greater incentives than their unelected predecessors to keep their
constituents informed, or at least to stay in contact with them.
But those officials also have incentives to maintain secrecy, to avoid controversy
over policies or to hide incompetence and/or corruption. Government officials
everywhere try to avoid scrutiny, even honest officials in well-established democracies.
The holding of regular, free and fair elections does not always bring with it governmental
willingness to report on governmental activities.  Despite many promises and the release
of a pro-transparency White Paper by the current government, Britain has yet to
promulgate a freedom of information act allowing public access to information about the
doings of the government.  The European Union is similarly struggling with
transparency.  Under its Amsterdam treaty, all citizens and legal persons in the European
Union acquired a right of access to documents of the European Parliament, the European
council, and the European commission, a fairly significant change in the way the
European Union has operated.  Transparency is as popular a catch phrase in the European
Union as it is in the World Bank and the IMF, frequently mentioned by EU officials in
speeches and scattered throughout European Union documents.  But practice lags well
behind promise.
Thus, even more significant to the future of transparency than the spread of
electoral systems is the rise of civil society: organized groups who in many cases sustain
the pressure for transparency, playing a crucial role as monitors.  Non-governmental
organizations are not only monitoring governments and firms within given countries but
are increasingly linking themselves into transnational networks that collectively can
                                                                                                                                           
9 This paper follows the Anglo American tradition of viewing civil society as a Third Sector distinct from
both governments and profit-seeking firms, rather than the continental European tradition that conflates for-
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impose powerful demands for information (Florini forthcoming). In virtually every
international issue area imaginable, such non-governmental actors, particularly in the
form of NGOs, are becoming more numerous and more effective in their demands for
greater transparency from governments, international organizations, and the private
sector.  Networks of such groups have pounded away relentlessly at the World Bank for
many years now, and are showing increasing interest in the IMF (Center of Concern
1998; Florini forthcoming; Fox and Brown 1998; Scholte 1998, 1999).  As described
above, it was Transparency International, an international NGO established in 1993, that
took the lead in creating new and heavy pressures on governments and corporations to
open up many of their internal processes to scrutiny.  As civil society grows more
vigorous around the world, facilitated by information technology, democratization, and
not least the growing funding it is receiving from governments, international
organizations, and foundations, its demands for transparency will escalate. (Interestingly,
civil society itself has been largely exempt from the spotlight, although critiques of the
unaccountability of NGOs indicate that such pressures are beginning to arise (Simmons
1998).)
The U.S. Role:  At a time when the need for new tools to manage global
integration is so obvious, the world's leading power happens to be one whose ideology,
values, and experiences lead it to favor transparency (Lee and Parker 1984; Stiglitz
1999). It is not only in the economic area that the U.S. has leaned toward standards of
high transparency.  Starting in the 1950s, for example, the United States argued
vociferously that the advent of nuclear weapons gave their possessors new
responsibilities to provide information about their military capabilities and intentions – a
                                                                                                                                           
profit firms with all other non-governmental actors as part of civil society.
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perspective the Soviet Union came to share in the Gorbachev period (Florini 1996).  In
the 1980s, the U.S. became the first country to pass a law mandating that companies that
emit certain quantities of certain toxic chemicals report publicly on those emissions as a
way of shaming companies into reducing their emissions without having to impose
regulatory limits, a precedent now being imitated around the world (Emergency Planning
- Community Right to Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. sec. 11001-11050,
www.oecd.org/ehs/prtr/index.htm).
This is not to claim that the United States is a paragon of unselfish transparency.
That environmental law passed Congress by a single vote.  U.S. demands for military
information from the Soviet Union combined U.S. security interests with an opportunity
to score propaganda points against a relentlessly secretive adversary.  Certainly, the U.S.
has plenty of less-than-stellar experience with less-than-forthcoming securities dealers
(Reinicke 1998, pp. 93-97).  And there are strong signs that the U.S. government's
propensity to impose transparency on others may be running headlong into American
suspicion of government and demands for protection of privacy, as was evident in the
discussion on money laundering.  But overall, the presumption in American governance
favors transparency on the part of corporations and governments.  Now, Americans
naturally tend to apply that perspective to international problems as well.
One could think of these factors in supply-demand terms.  If demand for
information has a normal downward slope, there is effective demand for more
information as the price falls.  Technology is creating that fall in price, leading to a shift
along the demand curve.  But the other factors are at least as important in explaining the
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rise of transparency.  They represent a shift outward of the demand curve, as new reasons
for wanting information emerge.10
None of these factors seems likely to diminish anytime soon. The information
revolution is accelerating everywhere, albeit unevenly. Civil society is both growing and
becoming more demanding in virtually all regions of the world.  The U.S. role as the
world's dominant power seems assured for years, if not decades, to come.  Calls for
transparency will outlast the current financial crisis, and if anything are likely to grow.
Fostering a Culture of Transparency
Nonetheless, it will not be easy to overcome the incentives that corporations,
governments, financial institutions, and inter-governmental organizations all have to
withhold or distort information.  To do so will require sustained effort toward entrenching
a norm favoring transparency among these many actors.  The idea of fostering a culture
of transparency may sound vague, even idealistic, but it actually is a quite concrete call
for changing not only the incentives people face but how they think about those
incentives.  There is powerful historical evidence that even highly resistant actors can be
induced over time to change their views of transparency.
One of the reasons the Cold War ended peacefully is that a norm of transparency
came to prevail in the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Florini 1996).
According to this norm, countries expect to provide information on their military
capabilities and plans, even, perhaps especially, to their adversaries, to prove their benign
intentions.  By the time the Soviet Union ceased to exist, East and West had enmeshed
themselves in a web of treaties requiring highly intrusive inspections of one another’s
                                               
10 My thanks to Daniel Morrow for suggesting this analogy.
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most sensitive military installations.  Allowing such openness conflicts sharply with
millennia of military strategy, because that information is just as useful for targeting as it
is for reassuring.  Yet somehow, a norm of transparency was fostered even in this least
likely of settings.
This was no accident.  It was the result of decades of consistent effort.  For three
decades, the United States did everything in its power to promote the novel idea that the
only reason the Soviet Union would insist on secrecy about its military capabilities was
that it was hiding nefarious plans.  This demand for transparency was purely self-
interested, of course – the U.S. was desperately trying to get whatever information it
could on the first adversary in nearly two centuries able to threaten it within its own
borders.  Since the US was a far more open society than the USSR, at best the proposals
for intrusive arms control inspections and mutual overflights could even the balance of
information between the two, and at a minimum calling for transparency would score
propaganda points.  But it worked. After decades of adamant Soviet rejection of such
proposals, to everyone’s great surprise in the mid-1980s the USSR, under new leadership,
suddenly starting accepting them and even outbidding the US on the degree of
transparency proposed.  The USSR simply changed its mind about transparency, deciding
that the reassurance value outweighed the risks.
If a culture of transparency can be fostered in so unlikely a setting, can the same
be done among the much wider range of actors involved in the global economy, and
within governments throughout the world?  Achieving such an ambitious goal will
require consistent effort over a long period of time, often in the face of what appears to be
adamant resistance. One step is to change the immediate costs and benefits of
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transparency for governments and corporations by making the targets accountable for
being transparent.  In other words, there must be rewards for transparency and penalties
attached to opacity.   So far, it is not clear to what degree markets will reward
transparency or penalize opacity.  To make it easier for them to do so, the IMF and the
World Bank should maintain transparency registries, as discussed above.  The
international financial institutions can also make transparency a condition for receiving
loans, but the stick of conditionality is a blunt instrument that tends to raise the hackles of
the countries to whom it is applied, making it a less than ideal means for changing minds
(Phillips 1999).  Persuasion may work better, especially to the degree that the World
Bank and the IMF make themselves fully transparent institutions, providing important
demonstrations through their own behavior that transparency, despite its discomforts, is a
highly effective means of improving the legitimacy and functioning of an institution.
But a culture of transparency will not come about solely as the result of hectoring
(or even conditionality) applied by the international financial institutions.  If it ever is to
come to seem normal for corporations and governments to reveal the kinds of
information discussed in this paper, and if the information revealed is to do any good, it
will be necessary to develop indigenous constituencies for transparency. Experience in
several issue areas, from the history of the Bank itself as a target of calls for transparency,
to the environmental field, to the realm of domestic politics, suggests that civil society is
crucial to the creation of systems of transparency-based governance.  This includes policy
research institutes able to serve both as reviewers of existing policies and as fonts of
policy innovation (Stone 1996).  It also includes the more familiar non-governmental
advocacy organizations.  NGOs can be annoying, but their very relentlessness and single-
35
mindedness make them invaluable allies.  They demand information – and keep
demanding it.  By keeping the pressure on, they can make the costs of opacity higher than
the costs of transparency.
Such constituencies for transparency are emerging already in the form of the
media, policy research institutes, and civil society organizations in many parts of the
world.  But too often these are poorly funded and widely scattered organizations trying to
operate in settings where both human capital and social capital are sorely lacking.
Moreover, only a handful are themselves as transparent as they call on governments,
corporations, and inter-governmental organizations to be, threatening their own
legitimacy in the long run.  The World Bank’s substantial program of support for the
development of human capital and social capital should explicitly be aimed at creating
domestic constituencies that can effectively demand transparency within their own
societies.
Conclusion
Transparency plays many beneficial roles in both markets and governance, roles
that merit greater attention by the World Bank and the IMF.  It appears to increase the
efficiency with which markets operate and may reduce the likelihood of  financial crises,
although the evidence here is surprisingly thin and further research is required.  On
governance, transparency is logically necessary for accountability.  Such accountability is
the political equivalent of the efficiency generated by competition between firms.  Since
political authorities are monopolies, “competition” occurs between ideas rather than
organizations.  Transparency makes such open competition of arguments and policies
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possible.
Achieving such transparency is no easy task.  It requires thinking beyond the
disclosure standards that are being so widely discussed to questions of the incentives
facing corporations and governments.  Although the international financial institutions
can do some good directly, by modeling the advantages of transparency through their
own behavior and conceivably by applying conditionality under some circumstances, the
crux of the problem will be the development of widespread national as well as
international constituencies for transparency.  Such constituencies exist in embryonic
form, but because most lack meaningful resources, they will need help to develop.
As the World Bank transforms itself from a provider of financial capital to a
Knowledge Bank, and as the IMF struggles to come up with effective approaches to
managing the global financial system, one of the most useful contributions these
institutions could make would be to promote the norm of transparency.  Such promotion
would start with a renewed push to ensure that the World Bank and the IMF themselves
are operating in a highly transparent manner.  It would also involve quite conscious
planning for incorporating the norm of transparency systematically into Bank and Fund
programs.
The World Bank and the IMF have every right – indeed, an obligation – to
promote transparency wherever and however they can.  Their role as agents for both their
member governments and all those affected by their programs oblige them to make
information on their own processes and policies accessible to all concerned.  Their roles
as central players in the management of the global economy oblige them to promote the
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use of tools, like transparency, that can contribute to global governance in the absence of
global government.
Such governance must be transparent because, as many governments and
international organizations have found to their dismay in recent years, secretive decision-
making by small elites can no longer be sustained. Contrary to the claims often made by
central bankers, government officials, and even some in the World Bank and the IMF that
decision making on technical or complex subjects is best left to the experts, without
informed participation by all those affected, policy decisions will fail to take into account
important information and interests and will lack the legitimacy that only public voice
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